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INTRODUCTION
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: CHANGING
THE RULES OR CHANGING THE WILL?
Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum* and Kelly Signs**
The increasing interdependence of world markets is changing how
nations regulate their respective markets. Every national policy maker
is concerned about international competitiveness. The United States
Congress is no exception.
Whether the debate is over new environmental regulations, fair labor
standards, or federal antitrust law, one always hears the argument that
American companies will not be able to compete in international mar-
kets if Congress pursues this policy or adopts that regulation. The ar-
gument is premised on the fear that American companies have lost
their competitive edge against foreign competitors, both domestically
and overseas, due to excessive or burdensome United States regula-
tions. American companies are often portrayed as vexed with costly
regulations while foreign competitors are not only unfettered by gov-
ernment interference, but are, in some cases, organized, encouraged,
and subsidized by their respective governments. United States laws are
assailed as creating an uneven playing field for domestic companies in
relation to the laws governing foreign firms in their home markets.
The growing perception that American policy makers are obligated
to remove regulatory and financial burdens from American companies
so that these companies can compete for a greater share of the interna-
tional marketplace highlights two distinctly conflicting views of the
United States competitive position in the world economy. The first view
* Chairman, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.
** Former Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.
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portrays the United States as an aging industrial giant, no longer able
to compete with better organized and better financed foreign firms that
are protected in their home markets and relentless in their quest to
dominate overseas markets, particularly in the United States. Advo-
cates of this theory assert that the United States laws assure foreign
firms free access to American markets and yet prevent domestic firms
from joining together to capitalize on opportunities overseas. These ad-
vocates urge Congress to remedy this imbalance by making American
laws conform to the laws that American corporations face abroad.
Moreover, they propose that the United States limit access by foreign
firms to American markets, and encourage cooperation between the
government and industry to bolster American competitiveness in for-
eign markets and improve the U.S. trade balance.
In contrast, the second view portrays the United States as a large,
but still powerful, competitor struggling to succeed both domestically
and in increasingly important foreign markets. While advocates of this
view admit that American productivity is declining, they believe such
losses are reversible. In order to restore America's technological advan-
tage, they recommend innovation, aggressive competition, and more ef-
fective management of corporate assets. They blame much of the cur-
rent competitive malaise on the managerial excesses of the 1980s:
allowing the desire to merge overcome the desire to compete; suffocat-
ing assets with debt; and sacrificing long-term strategies to short-term
goals. Advocates of this theory recommend that the United States gov-
ernment persuade other countries to move towards our free market
model by changing their laws to remove restrictions on their markets
and by enforcing existing limitations on cooperative arrangements both
here and overseas.
These two views of corporate America represent more than just a
rehash of the age-old debate between "protectionists" and "free mar-
keters." Rather, these theories represent a far more complicated debate
about the future of American companies in the world economy. For
instance, will American firms succeed in marketing products in the
emerging economies of the new democracies of Eastern Europe as these
countries reorganize into free market economies? Will European and
Asian companies flood American markets with new products, and how
will this affect the American economy?
Regardless of the answers to these questions, it is clear that policy
makers cannot guarantee the success of American businesses. Domestic
companies must face the challenge of foreign competition with better
products, better service, and lower costs. American consumers are not
likely to give up the variety of imported products that have poured into
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our country in the past twenty years. The era when United States man-
ufacturers could rely on established customer relationships to sell all
their products close to home is long gone.
Thus, legislators are left to ponder the question of whether American
antitrust policy fosters or deters the expansion of American firms in
international markets.' Several bills are pending in Congress to relax
United States antitrust standards to encourage joint activity among do-
mestic firms.2 Proponents of reform argue that American firms are fall-
ing behind in innovation and production because no single firm can af-
ford to invest in new technology. Moreover, they argue that the
antitrust laws discourage cooperative ventures that would otherwise en-
able American companies to compete more vigorously against foreign
firms. Finally, they claim that restrictive antitrust policies impose addi-
tional costs on American firms in relation to rival foreign corporations.
Relaxing the antitrust laws will not make America more competitive.
On the contrary, the United States is suffering from a decade of per-
missive competition policy that allowed mergers and other business
combinations of unprecedented size to transform the American econ-
omy. During the 1980s, American companies spent more than $1.2 tril-
lion to purchase more than 30,000 companies. While American compa-
nies were busy analyzing acquisition prospectuses, foreign companies
were investing in new technology and new products. While corporate
CEOs signed merger agreements, their customers were wooed away by
foreign firms that offered better quality and service.
The proposals to weaken United States antitrust laws stem from a
general misunderstanding of the antitrust treatment afforded to cooper-
ative ventures under existing law. Current antitrust laws prohibit only
those cooperative ventures in which the threat to competition outweighs
the procompetitive benefits. Domestic companies increasingly utilize
1. See generally Hearings on Production Joint Venture Legislation Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1 (1990) (statement of Senator Howard Metzen-
baum, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust) (regarding proposals to relax anti-
trust laws with respect to production joint ventures); Joint Production Ventures. Hear-
ings on Antitrust Reform Before Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., ist Sess. 1, 1 (1989); H.R. Rep. No.
516, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1 (1990) (proposing a bill to amend the National Cooper-
ative Research Act of 1984 to reduce liability for joint ventures).
2. S. 479, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REC. S2263 (Feb. 22, 1991); H.R.
1604, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H2083 (Mar. 22, 1991); H.R. 1024,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H318 (Feb. 21, 1989); H.R. 4611, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H1761 (Apr. 25, 1990); S. 1006, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S5395-97 (May 16, 1989); S. 2692, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136
CONG. REC. S7001-02 (May 24, 1990).
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joint ventures for specific collaborative projects with competitors or
firms in related industries in order to reduce capital costs and spread
risks. In fact, antitrust challenges to joint ventures by either govern-
ment or private plaintiffs are rare.
Moreover, proponents of antitrust reform tend to overestimate the
extent and success of cooperation among foreign firms. Dr. Michael
Porter of the Harvard Business School spent several years studying the
success of various companies throughout the world, resulting in the
widely-read The Competitive Advantage of Nations.3 Dr. Porter noted
that, despite the fact that the Japanese government strongly encourages
Japanese firms to share important new technology with each other, the
firms are very protective of their proprietary research. In fact, he
found that most of the research that results in commercially successful
technology is developed within a single Japanese company, not in con-
sortia.5 Dr. Porter concluded that "competition among a group of firms
was by far the most powerful force for stimulating innovation that re-
sulted in competitive advantage."' Accordingly, it is easy to see why
removing legal disincentives from cooperative activity may not necessa-
rily result in more cooperative ventures, nor in more productive joint
ventures.
The desire to benefit from the fruits of one's own labor is a basic
tenet of American business. This jealousy is a much more serious bar-
rier to cooperation among American firms than any legal risks associ-
ated with joint efforts. For example, the computer industry lauded U.S.
Memories, the IBM-headed consortium of major computer companies
and semiconductor manufacturers formed to produce memory chips.
U.S. Memories struggled in the early stages as it tried to assess costs
among members and protect members' technological contributions. In
the end, U.S. Memories died of its own weight: members that looked to
the consortia to supply memory chips were unwilling to make long-term
commitments while adequate supplies were available at low prices from
foreign suppliers.7 Other chip makers were unwilling to devote their
proprietary research "for the good of the whole"8 without adequate
3. M. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).
4. Id. at 635-36.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 636.
7. Richards, Sources Say U.S. Chip Cooperative to Fold, Wash. Post, Jan. 13,
1990, at Cl.
8. See Pollack, Memory Chip Cooperative is Officially Declared Dead, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at DI, D19 (explaining reasons why the joint venture failed).
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compensation or risk allocation.9 Thus, the failure of U.S. Memories
illustrates that conflicting goals and investment targets, not antitrust
laws, are the fundamental barriers to the success of any collaborative
effort.
The United States needs a strong competition policy with vigorous
enforcement of antitrust laws to ensure that American companies are
prepared to compete with foreign companies. This will force American
companies to adopt basic strategies of good business management and
to cease shopping for shortcuts. Not all joint ventures are bad; however,
it is equally true that not all joint ventures are beneficial. Current anti-
trust policy reflects a balance between American businesses' need to
reduce costs by avoiding duplicative efforts and the dangers of stifling
creativity under a mantle of "management by committee."
There is an additional risk to looking to antitrust reform as a pan-
acea for America's competitive ills. The case for reform asks us to ac-
cept the view that America is an aging industrial giant that cannot
catch up with ruthless foreign competitors. While United States indus-
try is not without problems-both in industry structures that hamper
quick response to new opportunities and in infrastructure deficiencies in
education and job training-it has its advantages as well. American
manufacturing companies are still the most productive in the world.10
Moreover, the United States spends more on research and development
than any other country. 1 Also, few countries enjoy a standard of living
comparable to that in the United States. With other countries gaining
on us, the United States is faced with the challenge of capitalizing on
its strengths. Arguing for antitrust reform focuses on this country's
weaknesses, which places the United States at risk of convincing itself
that it has lost its competitive edge. The world is indeed shrinking; but
the United States should not respond by circling the wagons.
9. Id.; see also Yoder, Lessons Linger as U.S. Memories Fails, Wall St. J., Jan.
16, 1990, at BI (examining the impact of U.S. Memories' failure).
10. Carey, The Myth that America Can't Compete, Bus. WK., June 15, 1990. at
46.
11. Port, Why the U.S. is Losing its Lead, Bus. WK. June 15, 1990. at 35.
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